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Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests1963 Tennessee Survey
Herman L. Trautman*
I. DECEDENTS' ESTATES

A. Intestate Succession-Tort Recoveries
B. Wills-Execution Problems
C. Fiduciary Administration and Estate Planning-New Legislation

H. TRusTs
A. Charitable Trusts and Corporations
B. Spendthrift Policy and the Consent Decree
C. Purpose Accomplished Before Activation

HI. FUTrRt

INTERESTS

A. Perpetuities-CharitableException

The subject matter will be discussed under the three headings

indicated above. The developments of the year include court decisions and relevant new legislation enacted by the Eighty-Third General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.
rs' ESTATES
I. D.EcmFia
A. Intestate Succession-TortRecoveries
Three interesting cases represent significant developments in the
laws concerning the distribution of amounts received by the administrator in wrongful death actions, two' of which arose under the Tennessee wrongful death statute2 and the other3 arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.4 The two cases arising under the

Tennessee statute were problems of somewhat first impression,
reasoned upon analogy, and the case arising under the federal statute
resulted in the Tennessee Supreme Court overruling its prior decision.
In Anderson v. Anderson,5 the question was whether or not a father
who had completely abandoned a minor child is entitled to share in
the distribution of proceeds recovered in an action for the wrongful
death of the child, there being no nearer next of kin than mother and
father. While the deceased child had been reared by and lived with
his mother, the parents had never been divorced, nor had custody
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Nashville and Tennessee Bars.
1. Anderson v. Anderson, 366 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1963); Damron v. Damron, 367
S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1963).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-607, 20-609 (1956).
3. Lawrence v. White, 211 Tenn. 81, 362 S.W.2d 464 (1962).
4. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
5. Supra note 1.
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been awarded to the mother. Tennessee Code Annotated sections
20-607 and 20-609 provide that the damages for wrongful death shall
pass to the next of kin where there are no spouse or children. The
court held that the reference to next of kin in the wrongful death
statute makes necessary the application of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 31-201(4), concerning the intestate succession of personal
property owned by decedent. It is there provided that the father and
mother share in equal parts unless they have been divorced by a
valid decree which commits the custody of the decedent to one parent
"to the exclusion of the other," in which case the distribution is to be
made wholly to the parent having custody. Since there was no such
decree, the father was entitled to share under the statute. The court
said that absent a statutory provision otherwise it is a general rule
that a surviving parent's misconduct, e.g., abandonment or unfaithfulness does not bar a right of succession. It was said that New York
and other states have a statute which expressly provides that a father
who abandons an infant child is not allowed to receive a distributive
share of the child's estate.
In Damron v. Damron,6 the minor child was killed in an automobile
accident after the parents were divorced under a decree which
awarded the custody of the child to the mother, with the right of
visitation for reasonable lengths of time and the obligation of support
to the father. The question was whether the granting of reasonable
rights of visitation to the father prevented the award of custody to
the mother from being "to the exclusion" of the father. While the
divorce decree did not use the word "exclusive," a settlement agreement upon which the decree was based provided that the exclusive
custody of the child should be awarded to the mother. It was held
that there is a recognized difference between custody and the right of
visitation, and that it is the award of custody which determines the
right of intestate succession under Tennessee Code Annotated section
31-201(4). A previous case 7 had determined that where the custody
of the child has been awarded to the mother, she is the sole next of
kin where there is no mention of visitation rights. Also, another
previous case8 has decided that a temporary award of custody will
not determine intestate succession from the child.
Lawrence v. White9 involved the proper distribution of money
paid in settlement of a claim for wrongful death of an employee
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.10 The decedent left a
6. Supra note 1.
7. Black v. Roberts, 172 Tenn. 20, 108 S.W.2d 1097 (1937).
8. Shelton v. Shelton, 198 Tenn. 346, 280 S.W.2d 803 (1955).
9. Supra note 3.
10. Supra note 4.
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widow who was entirely dependent upon him and an adult son by
a former marriage, who was not a dependent. The chancellor had
held that the amount of the settlement should be divided between
the widow and son in accordance with the Tennessee statute on
intestate succession. This decision was based upon the decision of
the Tennessee Supreme Court in In re Smith's Estate." In that case
the county court had ordered distribution of the proceeds among the
widow and four minor children of the decedent on the basis of the
proportion of the number of years of support from the decedent that
each beneficiary was entitled to the total number of years of support
that all beneficiaries were entitled, as determined by the life expectancy of the deceased and the respective ages of the minor children.
Thus the widow was allowed to inherit on the basis of her life expectancy, 12 and the children were allowed to inherit for the number of
years, or fraction thereof, that each lacked being twenty-one years of
age at date of death. The eldest son, who was entitled to less than
one year of additional support, filed a petition insisting that he was
entitled to a one-fifth share under the Tennessee statute on intestate
succession. The court in Smith's Estate applied the Tennessee statute
of distribution, thus sustaining the petition of the eldest son and
reversing the county court. It is this decision which is expressly overruled by the supreme court in Lawrence v. White. In the instant case
the court decided that the entire amount of the settlement proceeds
should be distributed to the dependent widow under the provisions of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and that the Tennessee statute
on intestate distribution was not applicable. Actually, a previous
decision 13 by the same court, cited but not discussed, had held that
the Tennessee statute was not applicable. There the court attempted
to distinguish Smith's Estate, whereas in the instant case the court
overrules it. Presumably, an apportionment of the settlement proceeds
on the basis of the number of years of expected support of each
beneficiary in relation to the total number of years of expected support
for all dependents will be the appropriate method of distributing compromise settlements under the Federal Act, since it limits recovery
to "next of kin dependent upon such employee." 14
B. Wills
The efficacy of a well written attestation clause to establish the due
execution of a will is illustrated in Bradford v. Bradford,5 a case
11. 191 Tenn. 69, 231 S.W.2d 569 (1950).
12. Query, should it not have been on the basis of the husband's life expectancy, or
period to retirement?
13. Oakley v. Nashville C. & St. L.R.R., 196 Tenn. 395, 268 S.W.2d 110 (1954).
14. Supra note 4.
15. 364 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
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which was tried four times before a jury and on former appeals by
both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The
recitals of the attestation clause give rise to a legal and controlling
presumption of fact and it is only where there is positive testimony16
to the contrary that a question is raised for submission to the jury.
Accordingly, it was held that there was no error in first admitting the
will in evidence on the basis of the present recollection of one subscribing witness, and then directing a verdict on the issue of due
execution at the close of the contestant's proof, where there was no
contradiction of the recitals of the attestation clause. The inability
of the second subscribing witness to recall the execution of the will
was held not sufficient to make the execution of the will a question of
fact for the jury. The second subscribing witness was able to identify
her signature as a witness and that of the first subscribing witnessher former employer. The court distinguished Fann v. Fann,17 where
one of the subscribing witnesses contradicted the attestation clause
by positive testimony that he did not sign in the presence of the other
witness.
Holographic wills continue to exact a heavy toll in Tennessee in
terms of expense, time and probably ill-feelings. In re Padgett's Wilt'8
is a typical example-one in which there were incurred the expense of
three teams of lawyers, a trial in the circuit court, an appeal to the
court of appeals, which reversed and remanded for a new trial to
determine which of two different groups were intended by the testator
to be his residuary legatees. In this case there were two holographic
wills. One was dated April 10, 1959; it was witnessed and executed
with the formalities of an attested will. The other will was written on
two pieces of paper; the first of which was dated January 15, 1959 at
the top and the second page was dated August 31, 1959 at the bottom.
Testator handed the April will to the named executor for safe-keeping,
together with a list of his assets; he made references to it as his will in
1960 and prior to his death in 1961, and made additions to the accompanying list of assets. The double-dated will was found in his desk.
The circuit court directed a verdict for the double-dated will because
of the later date on the second page. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the issues should have been submitted to the jury to
determine which was intended by the testator to be his effective will.
On retrial the jury rendered a verdict for the double-dated will and
the court of appeals affirmed. A petition for certiorari was filed June
24, 1964. Is it not time to consider the holographic will on public
16. Fann v. Fann, 186 Tenn. 127, 208 S.W.2d 542 (1948).
17. Ibid.
18. 364 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962); decision on appeal from retrial aft'd,
unpublished opinion, Tenn. App. M.S. March 27, 1964, Maury law.
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policy grounds? Tennessee is one of only nineteen states which permit
them. Every year it seems that there are one or more cases reaching
the appellate courts of this state to determine a most elementary-yet
fundamental-problem concerning the intention of the decedent.
While there is a school of thought which abhors the legalistic
language of lawyers and argues for the dignity implicit in the personal
mystery of each human being who wishes to write his own will, one
often suspects that the predominant motive is to avoid the small
expense of having a capable lawyer write the will. So frequently an
expense of many thousands of dollars and countless time is incurred
by the estate because of this small saving.
C. FiduciaryAdministrationand Estate Planning
The significant developments in this area were in legislation enacted
by the Eighty Third General Assembly of Tennessee. Among these
perhaps the most interesting is chapter 110 of the Public Acts of 1963,
designated as Tennessee Code Annotated sections 35-616-35-619. It
provides that wills and trust instruments may by appropriate reference
to the statute incorporate by reference the fiduciary powers of administration set forth in the introductory paragraph and in any one or
more subparagraphs of section 35-618 numbered 'T'to "32". It would
seem that the purpose of the statute is a commendable one-to shorten
the length of trust instruments by providing a short-hand method for
including those more flexible powers of fiduciary administration which
are generally desirable in trust and estate management.19 It also
provides in statutory form an accessible catalogue of fiduciary powers
from which the draftsman can select those which might seem desirable. Among the powers enumerated are the authorization of an
executor to join a surviving spouse in the execution and filing of joint
income and gift tax returns; authority of an executor to continue
the operation of a decedents business in unincorporated form for so
long as he considers it desirable; authority to permit beneficiaries of
an estate to have the possession and use of real property and tangible
personal property without charge "to the extent that such action
will not adversely affect the rights and interests of any creditor"; 20
the power to lease real or tangible personal property for terms which
may exceed the duration of the estate or trust; the power to borrow
from the fiduciary in his or its individual capacity; the power to
retain investments initially received even though not productive of
income or otherwise authorized; the power to keep all or any portion
of the estate in liquid form or uninvested for such time as the fiduciary
19. See McMurray, Wills and Fiduciary Powers, 31
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-618(4) (Supp. 1963).

TE:NN.

L. REv. 191 (1964).
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may consider advisable, without liability for loss of income for so
doing; and the power to make distributions in kind or in cash. The
statute is not a Model Act nor one proposed by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws, and investigation indicates that it was not sponsored
by any business or professional organization in Tennessee; apparently
it was a privately sponsored statute which incurred no opposition in
the legislature.2 '
It would seem, however, that care must be exercised in selecting
some of the enumerated powers. The investment powers 22 include the
power to retain original investments even though not productive of
income and the power to keep all or any portion of the estate uninvested for such time as the fiduciary may deem advisable. If these
investment powers are applicable to a marital deduction trust, will
it not put a cloud on the allowance of the federal estate tax deduction?23 Internal Revenue Code section 2056(b) (5), requires that the
surviving spouse "is entitled for life to all the income" of the marital
deduction trust. The regulations 4 state that administrative powers
will not have the effect of disqualifying an interest passing in trust
unless the grant of powers evidences the intention to deprive the
surviving spouse of the beneficial enjoyment required by the statute.
Such an intention will not be considered to exist if "the applicable
rules for the administration of the trusts require, or permit the spouse
to require, that the trustee either make the property productive or
convert it within a reasonable time."25 If the fiduciary is given the
power to retain investments which are not productive of income "for
such time as the fiduciary may deem advisable," 26 can it be said that
the applicable rules of the trust require, or permit the spouse to require, that the trustee make the property productive within a reasonable time?
Also, in the case of wills and other trust instruments creating a
pecuniary marital deduction gift executed on or after October 1, 1964,
the draftsman should not incorporate the language of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 35-618(31). The language of this subsection permits the executor to make distribution of estate assets in kind in
satisfaction of pecuniary gifts. In order to preserve the federal estate
tax marital deduction it will be necessary to use language which
imposes a duty on the executor to select assets in such manner that
the cash and other property distributed will have an aggregate fair
21. Thus it differs from some of my proposals.
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-619 (18 and 19) (Supp. 1963).
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958).

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26.

TENN. CODE ANN.§

35-618(19) (Supp. 1963).
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market value which is fairly representative of the distributee's proportionate share of the appreciation and depreciation in the value to the
date or dates, of distribution of all property then available for distribution, as required by Revenue Procedure 64-19, dated April 13, 1964,
issued in TIR-553 on March 19, 1964.27
While there are other areas of caution, no doubt the statute will
serve a useful purpose in drafting wills and trusts. But care will be
needed in selecting and supplementing the powers enumerated in the
new statute.
Chapter 65 of the Public Acts of 1963, amends the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act 28 to permit gifts to minors in custodial form
of life insurance and endowment policies and annuity contracts.
Chapter 204 amends the Inheritance Tax Law, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 30-1604, to extend the forty-thousand dollar life insurance exemption to proceeds payable to the insured's estate for the
benefit of class A beneficiaries, even though it will thus be commingled
with other estate assets and subjected to claims, if the residuary estate,
of which the insurance has become a part, is ultimately given to or for
the benefit of class A beneficiaries. Prior to this the statute provided
an exemption of life insurance to the extent of forty-thousand dollars
"payable to Class A beneficiaries of the decedent and/or to a trustee
...
for such." In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. MacFarland,29 the testator-insured had life insurance in the amount of 26,385
dollars made payable to his executors and used apt words in his will to
commingle the insurance with other estate assets and subject it to
claims; he then gave his residuary estate in trust to his wife and issueclass A beneficiaries. The court interpreted the statute literally to hold
that because the life insurance proceeds qua life insurance were not
payable to either class A beneficiaries or to a trustee for such, the tax
exemption was lost; the court held that when the life insurance
proceeds were commingled with other estate assets in the hands of
the executor, they lost their identity as life insurance, so that the
exemption could not be applied. It was pointed out in a previous
survey article30 that while the court decision seems to be an accurate
interpretation of the statute as formerly written "the statute ought to
be revised either (1) to allow the exemption regardless of how
the insurance is made payable, or (2) to not allow the exemption at
all, as in the development of the federal statute."31 The legislature
27. Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964

INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 30.
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-801-810 (Supp. 1963).

29. 209 Tenn. 263, 352 S.W.2d 441 (1961).
30. Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trust and Future Interests-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 741, 747-49 (1963).
31. Id. at 748.

1034

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

responded by extending the life insurance exemption to proceeds
payable to the estate if the estate is given ultimately to or for the
benefit of class A beneficiaries.
This would seem to be a desirable change. As pointed out in the
previous article, 2 there is in fact a genuine need for some insurance
to be made payable to the executor so that he has the cash with which
to pay claims, taxes, and expenses. The statute in its former state discriminated in a sense against people of modest means; a person with
more than forty-thousand dollars of life insurance had no difficulty in
having that amount paid to class A beneficiaries or to a trust for them
and the balance paid to his estate to provide the needed cash. The insurance money paid to or for the benefit of class A beneficiaries would
probably not be needed for the settlement of the estate. A person with
less than forty-thousand dollars had to go the more complicated and
expensive route in order to get the tax exemption, i.e., a life insurance
trust for class A beneficiaries, with authority in the trustee to use the
proceeds to purchase estate assets from the executor-thus providing
the needed cash. While the life insurance trust with a pour-over
arrangement in the will is an excellent estate planning device, a tax
exemption ought not to be conditioned upon doing indirectly, through
complex and expensive methods, what can be done more conveniently
and directly through the executor without loss to the public revenue.
Does the statute accomplish the intended purpose? The 1963
amendment simply inserted the words "his estate or the executor(s) or
administrator(s) thereof (whether or not subject to claims against his
estate) for the benefit of such, and/or to" so that the forty-thousand
dollars life insurance inheritance tax exemption is provided for the
following: "the proceeds of such policies as may be payable to Class A
beneficiaries of the decedent and/or to his estate or the executor(s) or
administrator (s) thereof (whether or not subject to claims against his
estate) for the benefit of such, and/or to a trustee ... for such."
Literally, the statute exempts life insurance made payable to the
estate for the benefit of class A beneficiaries "(whether or not subject
to claims against his estate)." Since the rationale of American Na33 was
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. MacFarland
that when life insurance
proceeds are commingled with other estate assets and made subject
to claims, they lose their identity as life insurance proceeds and become a part of decedent's general residuary estate, might it be argued
that there remains a tracing requirement on the part of the executor
-to show that the assets turned over to or for the benefit of class A
beneficiaries includes in fact the life insurance proceeds paid to the
32. See note 30 supra.
33. Supra note 29.
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executor? Or, could the Commissioner defeat the tax exemption by
showing that in fact the life insurance proceeds were used to pay
claims, taxes and probate expenses so that the residue consisted only
partially of life insurance proceeds, or wholly of assets other than life
insurance proceeds? The argument of the Commissioner would probably concentrate on the words "for the benefit of such," i.e., class A
beneficiaries, to argue that life insurance proceeds used for the payment of claims, taxes and expenses are not for the benefit of such beneficiaries. Clearly, the purpose of 1963 amendment is otherwise, and it
would seem that the language used by the legislature is adequate to
accomplish the legislative purpose. When the residuary gift is either
to or for the benefit of class A beneficiaries, it would seem clear that
life insurance payable to the estate is payable to or for the benefit of
class A beneficiaries even though used to meet the cash requirements
of the estate, because it has increased the residuary estate distributable
to or for the benefit of such beneficiaries. But for the insurance proceeds other estate assets would have to be used to meet the estate's
cash requirements, so that the residuary gift to class A beneficiaries
would be smaller by the amount of claims, taxes and expenses so paid.
One of the primary reasons for life insurance in estate planning is to
provide the cash to the estate for such items so that there will be no
need for a forced sale of estate assets.
In re Jennings' Estate held that the proceeds recovered by an administrator under the medical payment clause of a liability insurance
policy are free from the claims of creditors under Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 26-213 and 26-214. The exemption was applied
to the claim of the hospital which rendered services in an effort to save
the life of the decedent because of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. While the court affirmed the result reached by the probate
court, it based the decision on the above statutory exemption from
creditors' rights of accident, health and disability insurance rather than
on the wrongful death statute. This is apparently a case of first impression in Tennessee.
II. TRusTs
A. Cy Pres-CharitableTrusts and Corporations
Two cases, Bell v. Shannon5 and Hardin v. Independent Order of
Odd Fellows,36 permitted a deviation from the express terms of the
trust instruments in order to accomplish the charitable purposes found
to have been intended by donors. In both cases the courts rejected the
suggestion that they were applying the judicial cy-pres doctrine, which
34. 368 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1963).
35. 367 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1963).
36. 370 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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has often been said to "have never obtained in Tennessee." 7 But the
court quotes good authority3 8 for the proposition that the power of a
court of equity to permit or direct a deviation from the terms of the
trust is at least as extensive in the case of charitable trusts as it is in the
case of private trusts; the courts will direct or permit a deviation from
the terms of the trust where compliance is impossible or illegal, or
where owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, compliance would defeat or substantially impair the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust. It seems clear that this
rationale will be liberally applied to redirect, or change the method or
manner of accomplishing what is an admittedly charitable purpose in
Tennessee, notwithstanding the rule that we must not say that this is
an application of the judicial cy-pres doctrine of equity. As has been
pointed out before, 9 to hold that equity has the inherent power to
direct or permit a deviation from the terms of the trust in order to
accomplish the purpose of the settlor is to announce a principle which
is in substance as effective as the judicial cy-pres doctrine concerning
charitable trusts, and, indeed, it is broader than cy pres because it is
applicable to private trusts. Perhaps this is a form of acceptance by
rejection.40
In Moore v. Neely,4 1 the court sustained the gift of a remainder
interest to Western State Hospital, a charitable corporation for the care
and treatment of the poor insane. Since the gift to the hospital was
"for the use of said institution in taking care of some other persons not
able to do so," it was contended that the gift to the hospital was in
trust, that the hospital has no corporate power to act as trustee, and
that the gift was too vague and uncertain to be enforced as a charitable trust. The court rejected the contention that the gift was in trust,
holding it to be a direct gift to the hospital for its use as a public,
charitable corporation.
B. Spendthrift Policy and the Consent Decree

The question has been previously asked whether the beneficiary of
a spendthrift trust can effectuate an assignment of his interest by entering into a consent decree in a court proceeding.42 While this is an in37. Id. at 849, and cases cited therein. See also Henshaw v. Flenniken, 183 Tenn.
232, 191 S.W.2d 541, Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1010 (1947).
38. 3 Scor-r, TRUSTS § 381 (2d ed. 1956).
39. Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1961 Tennessee Survey, 15 VAND. L. Rnv. 882, at 887 (1962).
40. See 17 VAND. L. REv. 633 (1964).
41. 370 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1963).
42. Trautman, Decedents" Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1253, at 1266 (1961), commenting on Burton v. Burton, 208
Tenn. 11, 343 S.W.2d 867 (1961).
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3
teresting abstraction, in Third National Bank v. Scribner, the court
makes clear that where there is a suit to construe the trust instrument
and the court finds that there is an ambiguity to be clarified, a consent
decree interpreting the trust instrument will not be subject to the later
attack that the beneficiary had no capacity to enter into 4a consent
decree. The court affirms the principle of Burton v. Burton, in which
the ambiguity was not so obvious.

C. Trust Purpose Accomplished Before Activation
Where the trust purpose has been accomplished, the trust will be
terminated and the legal title vested in the beneficiaries. The most
frequent illustrations of this principle are trusts to pay the income for
the life of a beneficiary, or until the beneficiary reaches a designated
age. In such cases the trust will be terminated upon the death of the
beneficiary, or when the beneficiary reaches the designated
income
45
age.
First American National Bank v. Cole" involved the construction
of a testamentary trust instrument where the will created residuary
trusts for two daughters, the share of each to be held until she attained
twenty-five years, at which time she should receive one-half of her
distributive share, the other half to be paid as each child attained
thirty years, "but in no event sooner than five (5) years after payment
of the first installment." The life beneficiary predeceased the testatrix
and at the latter's death both daughters were more than thirty years of
age. The problem was whether the executor should make distribution
to the trustee so that the trust should be activated and administered
for a period of years. It was held that the executor should make distribution directly to the daughters, that there was no longer a reason for
activating the trust, its purpose having been fully accomplished. The
court said that the five year holding period was intended to apply only
in case the trust distributions were to be made in two installments.
Presumably, if one of the daughters had been twenty-nine when she
received one-half of her share, she would have had to wait five years
for the second half.

III. FurruRE

INTEREsTs

A. Perpetuities-The Charitable Exception
Whitaker v. House47 is an interesting development in probate law.
It seems to be a case of first impression in Tennessee, and it may be so
43.
44.
45.
46.

370 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1963).
Supra note 42.
3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 334 (2d ed. 1956).
364 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1963).

47. 372 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1963).
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also in other jurisdictions. In 1938 the grantors made a deed of land to
the State of Tennessee "for... so long as said property is used as an
Armory or for Military purposes, but if said property should cease to
be used for Armory or Military purposes, the title therein to vest in the
City of Columbia, in fee simple." In 1940 the grantors made a second
deed conveying any remaining interest they may have to the state. In
1950 a small triangular part of this land was taken for the construction
of a new highway. The plaintiff is the lessee of the state and the defendant is the lessee of the city. The court decided that the executory
interest granted to the City of Columbia violated the rule against
perpetuities, that it was not within the exception for a gift to one
charity followed by a gift over to another charity, because this was
not a gift for charitablepurposes at all. It was pointed out that in 1938
the state had acquired the land in a commercial transaction from the
grantors for twelve-hundred dollars pursuant to enabling legislation
for the purpose of building an armory, a project in which the city cooperated. The court said that it would stretch the rules of construction
beyond the breaking point to include a sale of land for twelve-hundred
dollars to a state government within the definition of a gift for a charitable purpose.
This is a policy decision defining the scope of the charitable exception to the rule against perpetuities. The policy values supporting this
exception to the rule against perpetuities have not been clearly or fully
developed. 48 Normally the rule against perpetuities will be applied to
destroy remote contingent interests irrespective of whether their origin
was a commercial or a donative transaction. This exception to the rule,
however, may well be limited to donative transactions, i.e., a public
40
policy intended to encourage gifts for continuous charitable purposes.
While discussions of this exception to the rule are usually phrased in
terms of a "gift over" from one charity to another upon a remote condition, 0 there is no precedent cited in either the instant case or the
treatises which makes clear that the efficacy of this exception depends
upon whether the remote interest arose in a gift transaction, as distinguished from a commercial transaction. Nevertheless, a policy decision limiting the scope of this exception to the rule against perpetuities
to gifts to charity seems to be both consistent and wise.
48. 5 POWELL., REAL PmOPERTY § 770 (1962).
49. Ibid.
50. 6 AmEcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.40 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §
401.5 (2d ed. 1956); 3 SIMES & SMrnI, FUTuRE INTERESTS § 1281 (2d ed. 1956); 5
POWELL, REAL PnOPERTY § 770 (1962).

